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Causes of Action in Computer Litigation:
Special Problems for the Small or First Time User
INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in the field of computer' technology during
the past two decades have enabled an increasing number of
smaller businesses to automate what were once strictly manual
operations. 2 These new users of computer equipment and ser-
vices typically have no in-house computer personnel and no prior
data processing experience or training. :' Therefore, when decid-
ing whether to purchase or lease particular systems, these
"uneducated" users must rely upon the specialized product infor-
mation given to them by the vendors' more experienced repre-
sentatives. 4 This element of reliance transforms the computer
sale from a transaction between two business persons dealing at
1. A computer may be described as a device or series of devices capable of receiving
data (called input), performing arithmetical and other processing functions and produc-
ing outgoing data (called output). The physical machinery comprising a computer is
known as hardware. The functions that a computer performs are determined by sets of
instructions known as programs or, collectively, as software. See generally R. SIRN & N.
STERN, PRINCIPLES OF DATA PROCESSING (2d ed. 1979).
2. The two most significant factors in this trend toward automation are the decreas-
ing cost of acquiring computers and the development of smaller, more sophisticated sys-
tems. Benn & Michaels, "Multi-Programming" Computer Litigation, 64 CHi. B. REc. 32
(1982); Falk, The Small Computer Stands Tall, NATION-s Bus., Apr. 1981, at 75, 78.
3. Thus, there is significant potential that these uneducated users may sign vendors'
standard form contracts without knowing enough about computer systems or contracts
to protect themselves. See Benn & Michaels, supra note 2, at 33.
The provisions contained in these standard form documents are usually general and
written so as to protect the vendor, rather than the user. The larger, more experienced
buyer who is negotiating a large dollar purchase or lease may be both knowledgeable and
powerful enough to force the vendor to include provisions (usually in the form of "Addi-
tional Terms and Conditions") to protect his own interests. In some cases, the large buyer
may even persuade the vendor to substitute the standard form agreement with one
drafted and negotiated by both parties and tailored to the user's specific data processing
requirements.
In many cases, however, particularly where the small, first time buyer is concerned, the
only parts of the contract tailored to the particular needs of the user are the buyer's
name, the list of equipment model and serial numbers, the prices, and the delivery dates.
See infra notes 72, 87 and accompanying text.
4. Until very recently, however, computer vendors have been accustomed to dealing
with larger, more knowledgeable buyers. Furthermore, smaller accounts representing
lower commissions are often assigned to the vendor's younger, less experienced account
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arm's length to one resembling a consumer sale. 5
In the majority of these transactions, there are no major prob-
lems; the buyer gets a computer system that performs exactly as
expected in a timely, cost-effective manner. In many cases, how-
ever, the results fall far short of the user's expectations, 6 and the
user sues.
7
Thus far, traditional causes of action have given the new,
small user little relief.8 The courts have failed to deal satisfactor-
ily with the recurring problems generated by computer sales.9
They have continued to treat the small user as a business person
dealing at arm's length, regardless of the inherent disparity in
knowledge, expertise, and bargaining power which typically
representatives. This custom creates an ironic situation. In general, the larger the
account, the less experienced the sales representative needs to be. The large-scale buyer
usually has its own experts to evaluate the vendor's proposals and make recommenda-
tions. The smaller, less-experienced user, on the other hand, relies heavily on the vendor's
experience to evaluate the business's needs. The new user expects the purchase or lease
price he pays to include the cost, and therefore the benefit, of the vendor's superior
knowledge and experience. See Benn & Micahels, supra note 2, at 33 (describing a typical
transaction between the inexperienced buyer and the more knowledgeable computer
vendor and the reliance element involved).
5. Cf. Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877, 879-80
(6th Cir. 1982) (users, who had little knowledge of computers, were justified in relying
upon vendor's statements concerning the suitability and capabilities of its computer);
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 183 (8th Cir. 1971) (inexpe-
rienced user was justified in relying upon vendor's expertise in the field of data pro-
cessing; the inherent inequality of knowledge between the parties therefore supported the
user's claim of fraudulent misrepresentation against the vendor). But cf. Badger Bearing
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (court refused to consider
the disparity in knowledge between the user and the vendor a significant factor in eval-
uating the user's claim of unconscionability concerning a contractual disclaimer of
warranties).
6. The user's expectations may or may not be realistic and are often influenced by
such factors as lack of knowledge and experience, the mystique of the "black box," a
desire to achieve as quickly as possible the increased efficiency and lower costs (real or
imagined) automation may provide, no prior bad experiences in automation to induce a
more cautious approach, and the promises of overzealous computer salespersons.
See Benn & Michaels, supra note 2, at 32-33; Pollack, When Computers Don't Work,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1981, § 3 (Business Day), at 1, col. 3.
7. Litigation concerning computers is one of the fastest growing areas of law in the
United States judicial system today. It has been estimated that by 1985, computer-related
litigation will be exceeded in volume in the United States only by personal injury suits.
Johnson, Explosion in Industry Lawsuits Seen by '85, COMPUTERWORLD, June 1, 1981, at
16, col. 1.
8. These traditional causes of action include breach of contract, breach of express and
implied warranties, and fraud. See infra text accompanying notes 69-113, 125-38.
9. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 1, cols. 4-5, at 42, cols. 1-2.
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exists between the vendor and buyer in these cases.' 0 The courts
have also failed to take into account the unusually heavy losses
a small business experiences when a computer system fails. "
Because small users have been unable to obtain relief under
traditional causes of action, plaintiffs have begun to invoke an
increasingly wider range of actions.' 2 This note presents a sur-
vey of those actions. It begins with a brief history of computer-
related litigation and the development of the various causes of
action available to the aggrieved computer user. It then exam-
ines the current state of the law and the particular problems
posed for small, first time users. The note concludes with a dis-
cussion of future trends in computer litigation and offers an
alternative approach to the causes of action currently available
to the plaintiff-user.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER-RELATED LITIGATION
The Early Cases
Lawsuits involving computer equipment and software are a
relatively new subject of litigation. 3 Prior to 1972, only five
major cases arose involving the acquisition of computer equip-
ment.14 All were decided by federal courts and litigated under
10. See, e.g., Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (where the court cited plaintiffs status as a business person in refusing to allow a
claim of unconscionability against certain provisions of the vendor's standard form
contract).
11. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979)
(user claimed that because of the failure of the computer system it had acquired from
Honeywell, the company was forced to declare bankruptcy). See also Pollack, supra note
6, at 1, col. 3 (describing the potential effects of a computer failure on a small business).
12. These newly employed causes of action include negligent misrepresentation, neg-
ligence, computer malpractice, and unfair business practices.
13. Computers are a relatively new aspect of commercial life. The first commercial
computer, known as the Univac I, was delivered to the Census Bureau in 1951. Since
then, the technology of the digital computer has progressed through three major "genera-
tions" of development and has now entered the fourth generation. R. STERN & N. STERN.
supra note 1, at 21.
The growth of automation in small businesses has been one of the most dramatic
aspects of the development and use of commercial computers. For example, in 1981,
approximately 80,000 minicomputers, costing more than $768 million, were sold to small
businesses. Estimates are that sales in 1983 will exceed 200,000, costing more than $1.8
billion. A Business That Defies Recession, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 25, 1982, at 30, 31.
14. Lovable Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1970) (undergarments manu-
facturer sued the lessor of its computer equipment for damages caused by lessor's failure
to provide a system which performed as contractually specified); Sperry Rand Corp. v.
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the substantive laws of the forum state.1 5
In the earliest of these cases, Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial
Supply Corp.,16 the plaintiff, a distributor of agricultural and
industrial equipment, became dissatisfied with the performance
of the Univac 60 computer it had acquired from the defendant17
and brought suit to rescind the contract. Industrial Supply
asserted three causes of action in support of its claim against
Sperry Rand: breach of express warranty, 8 breach of implied
warranty of fitness, 9 and misrepresentation. 20 The court upheld
the breach of implied warranty claim, dismissing the other
Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964) (agricultural and industrial equip-
ment distributor sued the vendor of its computer equipment for damages and rescission
based on vendor's failure to provide a system which operated as warranted); Computer
Servicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906
(4th Cir. 1971); Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga.
1970) (computer lessor sued a user, a manufacturer of industrial lighting fixtures, for
failure to make lease payments, the user counterclaiming breach of contract on the part
of the lessor); Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn.
1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971) (auto parts distributor
sought reformation or rescission of its computer contract on the basis of vendor's failure
to provide a system which performed as represented).
15. Jurisdiction in all five cases was based on diversity of citizenship and amount in
controversy in excess of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). A federal court
having jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship must apply the substantive law of
the forum state, i.e., the law which would be applied by the state court in which the
federal court is located. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
17. Id. at 367.
18. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-313 (1)(a) (1978), an express
warranty may be created by "any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain."
The sale of computer hardware and software has been held to be a sale of goods and
thus subject to the U.C.C. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp.
765, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979). See Note,
Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MicH. L. Riv. 1149 (1979).
19. At common law, unless otherwise legally imposed, no warranties attached to a
contract for the sale of goods except those expressly stated in the contract. Under 1964
Florida law (the forum state's law in Industrial's case), there were two implied warran-
ties: a warranty that the article in question would be fit for the purpose for which it was
to be applied and a warranty that the goods would be fit for the ordinary purpose for
which such goods were used (i.e., that the goods were merchantable). Sperry Rand Corp.
v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
The U.C.C. currently recognizes both the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose and the implied warranty of merchantability recognized under Florida law.
U.C.C. §§ 2-315, 2:314 (1978).
20. It is not clear whether Industrial was claiming negligent or fraudulent misrepres-
entation, or both. The court stated only that Industrial averred that "false representa-
tions were wilfully, recklessly or negligently made by Sperry Rand." 337 F.2d at 365.
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causes of action as not supported by the facts.21
The court based its decision on three grounds. It found that a
breach of implied warranty was established because Sperry
Rand knew of the intended use of the equipment, the user was
justified in relying upon the seller's judgment in making the pur-
chase, and the equipment was not capable of fulfilling this pur-
pose.22 Although the integration clause23 contained in the con-
tract 24 precluded the court from considering any prior under-
standings or agreements, the court decided that under Florida
law the clause did not preclude the operation of the implied war-
ranty of fitness.25 Sperry Rand was therefore found liable.26
The second case, Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp.,27
arose five years later under Minnesota law. Clements Auto, an
auto parts distributor, sued the defendant vendor due to the
inadequate performance of its inventory control system.28 Cle-
ments sought reformation of the contract, or in the alternative,
rescission of the contract on the grounds of breach of implied
warranty, breach of contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation. 29
21. When a party seeks rescission of a contract, it asks the court to put the parties
where they would have been had the contract never been made. The court awarded
Industrial rescission plus damages for Sperry Rand's breach of its implied warranty of
fitness, dismissing the other two causes of action as not supported by the facts. In grant-
ing the award of rescission, the court decreed that Industrial should return the computer
equipment, and, in return, that Sperry Rand should pay to Industrial the original pur-
chase price of the equipment, plus certain incidental charges and expenses. Id.
22. Id. at 369-70.
23. The term "integration clause" denotes any statement in a writing which asserts
that the terms of that writing constitute the complete agreement between the parties.
Corbin states that where a valid integration clause is included in a contract, "antecedent
understandings and agreements fare] not admissible to vary or contradict [the] writing."
3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 576 (1960).
24. The integration clause in the written agreement signed by Industrial and Sperry
Rand read in relevant part: "The entire Agreement between the parties with respect to
the subject matter hereof is contained in this Agreement and no representation, except
when made in writing by a duly authorized officer ... shall be deemed to be part of this
Agreement,..." 337 F.2d at 370.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 373.
27. 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1971).
28. Clements claimed that the system took too long to produce invoices and made
numerous errors in the reports it created. Id. at 122.
29. The court described the elements of a cause of action in fraud as follows:
1. There must be a representation;
2. That representation must be false;
3. It must have to do with a past or present fact;
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The Clements court struck down the plaintiffs first two claims.
The breach of implied warranty claim was defeated because,
unlike the contract signed by the parties in Industrial Supply,
the Clements Auto contract contained a disclaimer of all express
and implied warranties.30 The court upheld this disclaimer as a
valid exclusion of the implied warranty of fitness of pur-
pose.3 1 The user's breach of contract claim was also dismissed
because the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages once the alleged
fraud was discovered.32
The court upheld the misrepresentation claim, however, find-
ing that Service Bureau Corp. had fraudulently misrepresented
the manner in which the inventory control system operated.33
The court observed that since Service Bureau Corp. had held
itself out to be an expert in data processing, the user was justi-
fied in relying upon Service Bureau's "superior knowledge in
that field." 34 It was this "inequality of knowledge" between the
user and vendor which the court found to be of particular impor-
tance and which warranted the award of damages.35
The remaining three pre-1972 cases which followed Industrial
Supply and Clements Auto rested upon claims of breach of con-
tract. In two of the three, the court found no cause of action pre-
sented by the facts. 36 In the third, the terms of the contract per-
4. That fact must be material;
5. It must be susceptible of knowledge;
6. The representer must know it to be false, or in the alternative, must assert
it as of his own knowledge without knowing whether it is true or false;
7. The representer must intend to have the other person induced to act, or
justified in acting upon it;
8. The other person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting;
9. That person's action must be in reliance upon the representation;
10. That person must suffer damage;
11. That damage must be attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the
statement must be the proximate cause of the injury.
444 F.2d at 175 (quoting Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1960)).
30. The disclaimer stated that "SBC makes no warranties, expressed or implied, other
than the express warranties contained in this agreement." 298 F. Supp. at 139.
Under the U.C.C. § 2-316, exclusions and modifications of express and implied warran-
ties are valid so long as the exclusionary statement is sufficiently conspicuous and, in the
case of warranties of merchantability, the word "merchantability" is used in the
disclaimer.
31. 298 F. Supp. at 139.
32. 444 F.2d at 186.
33. Id. at 183.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lovable Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1970) (lessee not entitled to
[Vol. 14
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mitted the user to terminate the unsatisfactory data processing
service agreement. 37 Of particular significance, however, was
the court's statement in one of these cases that, because the
plaintiff had prior data processing experience and could rely
upon a highly trained staff, the plaintiff knew precisely what the
vendor's equipment would do and was thus not at a disadvan-
tage in dealing with the vendor.38
When taken together, the few cases litigated during this period
make a significant contribution to the history of computer litiga-
tion for two reasons. First, they set forth the traditional causes of
action available to users seeking relief against computer vend-
ors. Second, they recognized that regardless of the user's status
as a business person, where the user was a small, first time
buyer, the relative positions of the parties could not be con-
sidered equal.
The Mid-1970's
The number of claims filed by dissatisfied users increased
dramatically during the mid-1970's as the use of computers by
small businesses became more widespread. 39 The majority of the
claims filed during this period were based upon the same causes
of action asserted by users in the earlier cases. As courts reas-
sessed the bargaining power of the first time user, however, the
success rate for users claiming under the earlier theories began
to decline.
A number of plaintiffs during this period, as in the earlier
period, included breach of contract and breach of express war-
ranty claims in their complaints. These cases were often resolved
in user's favor.40 In those cases where the user was unsuccessful,
damages for failure of computer to perform certain functions during 12 month lease trial
period); Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(user's counterclaim against vendor not supported by the facts).
37. Computer Servicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970),
aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
38. Honeywell v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 409. (N.D. Ga. 1970).
39. See Benn & Michaels, supra note 2, at 32.
40. See, e.g., Acme Pump Co. v. NCR Corp., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672 (1974)
(user recovered damages caused by vendor's failure to provide a working computer as
warranted); Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1974)
(user recovered damages equal to the difference between. the value of the computer as it
was actually programmed, and its value as it should have been programmed under the
contract); Atlas Indus., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975) (user recovered
19831
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at least one of three elements dictated the loss: 1) the facts
simply did not support a finding of breach; 41 2) the applicable
statute of limitations, imposed either by statute or by the terms
of the contract itself, barred the plaintiffs claim;42 or 3) the user's
remedies were limited to those described in the contract even
though the court found that the vendor had breached either the
contract or its express warranty. 43
Users claiming breach of implied warranties of fitness of pur-
pose and merchantability, as originally pleaded in Industrial
Supply, were only successful when there was either no disclaim-
er of warranties in the contract 44 or the vendor's attempts to dis-
claim the warranty were unsuccessful. 45 Typical of the courts'
damages for breach of warranties, the disclaimer of which failed to conform to Kansas'
commercial code); Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 350 So. 2d 988 (1977), aff'd as modified,
359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978) (user awarded rescission plus damages for vendor's failure to
provide a working accounting system); Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527
P.2d 557 (1974) (user awarded damages for vendor's failure to provide an accounting
system which operated as warranted); Triboro Quilt Mfg. Corp. v. Nixdorf Computer,
Inc., 54 A.D.2d 678, 387 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1977) (user obtained a rescission of its contract with
vendor for vendor's failure to provide required programs); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974)
(because computer was virtually worthless without proper programming, buyer was
entitled to damages for vendor's breach of agreement to furnish proper programming).
See also Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn.
1975) (discussing damage awards in breach of warranty cases.)
41. See, e.g., Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. NCR Corp., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977)
(noting that the jury made no finding as to user's counterclaim for breach of contract);
Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (disclaimer
effectively excluded all warranties); F.&M. Schaeffer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp.,
430 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (user's claim of breach of contract to vendor's replevin
action dismissed); Westfield Chem. Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (no genuine issues of material fact raised by the
user); NCR Corp. v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 302 A.2d. 486 (1973)
(user denied damages on breach of contract claim after parol evidence supporting user's
claim was excluded).
42. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enter., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976) (contract
included a limitation on actions for breach of one year, which had expired).
43. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C.
1974) (insurance company barred from recovery of incidental or consequential damages
by contract provision expressly limiting damages).
44. See, e.g., Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 350 So. 2d 988 (1977), aff'd as modified,
359 So. 2d 607 (La. .1978) (seller held bound by an implied warranty that the computer it
sold plaintiff was free of hidden defects and reasonably fit for intended use); NCR Corp.
v. Adell Indus. Inc., 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W. 2d 785 (1975) (continuous malfunction of
vendor's accounting machine constituted a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
intended use); Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 577 (1974) (defective
operation of vendor's accounting equipment constituted a breach of an implied warranty
of fitness for intended use).
45. See, e.g., Acme Pump Co. v. NCR Corp., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 337 A.2d 672 (1974)
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treatment of the user-vendor relationship during this period was
the reasoning employed in Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs
Corp.46 There, the user asked the court to strike the warranty
disclaimer contained in its computer contract as unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable. In refusing to do so, the court stated
that "[a]lthough the plaintiff was less knowledgeable concerning
computers than the defendant, [since he was] a business man he
must be deemed to possess some commercial sophistication and
familiarity with disclaimers." 47
This arm's length characterization of the relationship between
the inexperienced user and the more knowledgeable vendor dif-
fered from the approach employed by earlier courts in its failure
to consider the parties' disparate bargaining positions.4 As this
arm's length reasoning became more prevalent, vendors began
to write disclaimers into their standard form contracts. As a
result, the success rate for users claiming breach of implied war-
ranties continued to decline.49
Like the plaintiffs in both Clements Auto and Industrial
Supply, a number of users suing computer vendors during this
period also included claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. Most
of the courts considering such claims found in favor of the ven-
dor.50 In one case, for example, the court held that none of the
(vendor's disclaimer of warranties failed to conform to the U.C.C. requirements of conspi-
cuousness); Atlas Indus. Inc. v. NCR Corp., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975) (vendor's
disclaimer of warranties violated Kansas U.C.C.).
46. 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
47. Id. at 923.
48. See supra notes 22, 35 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. NCR Corp., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977);
IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enter., Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976); Badger Bearing Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977); Bakal v. Burroughs
Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1972) (all contracts contained effective disclaim-
ers of warranties).
50. See, e.g., Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. NCR Corp., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977) (jury
made no finding as to user's counterclaim for fraudulent misrepresentation); IBM Corp.
v. Catamore Enter., Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976) (court expressed no opinion on the
merits of user's claim that it was induced to enter its contract with IBM by fraud); Closed
Circuit Corp. of Am. v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (user's claim
of fraudulent misrepresentation barred because it merely restated the user's claim in con-
tract, having no separate basis in tort); Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975) (discusses proper award of damages in the event of a
finding of fraudulent misrepresentation); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974) (user's claim of fraud barred as having no separate basis in
tort, being a mere restatement of the plaintiff's contract claim); Westfield Chem. Corp. v.
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vendor's misrepresentations had been made intentionally and
that any statements as to the system's ability to meet the plain-
tiffs future data processing needs were merely promises of future
performance and not grounds for action.51 In contrast with ear-
lier decisions, consideration of the vendor's role as an expert in
the field or of the plaintiff's relative lack of expertise did not fac-
tor into the courts' determinations.
Two previously untried causes of action, negligence52 and neg-
ligent misrepresentation, 53 were introduced to the field of compu-
ter litigation during this period. Neither of these causes of action
proved successful, however.5 4
The Late 1970's and Early 1980's
The late 1970's and early 1980's brought a further narrowing
of the traditional contract and warranty actions available to first
time users. Although breach of contract and breach of express
Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (underly-
ing allegation of fraud claim identical with assertions contained in warranty claims and
therefore void); NCR Corp. v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486
(1973) (under Pennsylvania law, the parol evidence rule bars all extracontractual state-
ments from admission into evidence, even where such statements are fraudulent).
It is interesting to note that vendors were far more likely to succeed where the case was
litigated in federal court, whereas users were generally more successful in state court
settings. See also infra note 55.
51. Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 925 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
52. The elements of a cause of action in negligence may be stated as follows: 1. A duty
or obligation on the part of the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2.
Failure on the actor's part to conform; 3. A causal connection between the actor's con-
duct and the resulting injury (i.e., proximate cause); and 4. Actual damage, loss, or injury
to another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1976).
Note that in those jurisdictions where comparative negligence has not been adopted,
the plaintiff must also show a complete absence of negligence on his own part in order to
sustain a cause of action.
53. The RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRs § 552 (1976) defines an act of negligent
misrepresentation as follows:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liabil-
ity for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
54. See, e.g., Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(lessee failed to establish that the representations made by vendor concerning per-
formance of the computer system were false); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974) (user's negligence claim was merely a restatement of
the warranty claim and therefore void).
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warranty remained fairly successful causes of actionj by the
late 1970's, claims of breach of implied warranties (already on
55. See )unn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys.. Inc., 687 F.2d 877 (6th
Cir. 1982) (vendor found to have breached its lease agreement. by failing to provide a
system with all of the capabilities required without the user having to acquire additional
equipment); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 6:15 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), re/' g denied.
670 F.2d 1:304 (Od Cir. 1982) (breach of warranty occurred when vendor failed to provide a
computer system in good working order and free of defects, thus entitling user to an
award of damages); Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental lnforma-
tion Sys. Corp., 621 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1980) (vendor held liable for a breach of contract to
deliver a quantity of computer hardware to the user); Convoy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
601 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd as modified, 672 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982) (lessor of
computer equipment was liable to the lessee for damages caused by the installation of a
computer system which proved no faster than the old, manual method of performing the
same function and which worked only intermittently with many errors); Garden State
Food Distrib., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (1).N.J. 1981)-(user entitled to
recover damages for breach of warranty where the computer system provided by vendor
never operated to meet the user's needs and expectations); Hi Neighbor Enter., Inc. v.
Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823 (N.I). Fla. 1980) (vendor's motion for summary judg-
ment against user's claim that its computer system never functioned properly and that
vendor's support was inadequate, denied); Lovebright Diamond Co. v. Nixdorf Computer
Corp., No. 78 Civ. 4585 (HFW) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1979) (vendor's motion for summary
judgment against user's claim that vendor failed to produce software it had agreed to
provide, denied); Diversified Environments v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 460 F. Supp. 286
(M.D. Pa. 1978) (vendor breached its contract by failing to perform its obligations to train
lessee's employees and to make the user's computer system operational) Kalil Bottling
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980) (vendor breached its contract
with lessee by failing to provide a working computer system and by failing to install all
of the agreed software); Quad County Distrib. Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 68 11. App. 3d 16:3.
385 N.E.2d 1108 (1979) (vendor breached its contract with plaintiff by failing to provide
programs which worked to the user's specifications); Southern Hardware Co.. Ltd. v.
Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 373 So. 2d 738 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (case remanded for
further consideration of vendor's contact liability); Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Docktor
Pet Centers, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (lessor suing user for failure to
make lease payments permitted only a limited award where computer system failed to
perform as promised); Burrough Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md.
406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978) (user awarded damages for breach of contract and breach of
warranty caused by vendor's failure to provide working software); Rochester Welding
Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980) (vendor
breached its contractual obligations to user by failing to provide a working computer
system); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (grant-
ing of lessor's motion for summary judgment on its contractual and warranty liability
reversed).
But see Iten Leasing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982) (user failed to
establish that the system would not meet its objectives, needs, and requirements, as war-
ranted); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (claim
of breach of contract barred by statute of limitations); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four
Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, (E.D. Wis. 1982) (no issue of material fact concerning user's
claims of breach of contract and warranties); Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Informa-
tion Sys., Inc., No. 80 Civ. 5710 (DBB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1982) (oral contract did not
satisfy the statute of frauds); Sun 'n Fun Stores, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 79-2450-MA
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the decline) had become almost totally ineffective.56
In addition, vendors began to include limitations of the reme-
dies available to the user as part of their standard form compu-
ter contracts. 5 7 Such limitations were generally upheld against
claims of unconscionability. 58 In Earman Oil Co., Inc. v. Bur-
roughs Corp.,5 9 for example, the court once again invoked the
arm's length reasoning to strike down the user's claim that a
clause in the contract limiting its remedies to repair or replace-
ment of defective equipment was unconscionable.60
Claims of misrepresentation became increasingly popular
among first time users due to these further limitations to the suc-
cess of contract and implied warranty actions and remedies.
(D. Mass. Feb. 23, 1982) (facts did not support user's claim of breach of contract or breach
of express warranties); Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D.
Md. 1981) (buyer of an office computer could not show that problems were caused by
defects in material or workmanship and was therefore barred from recovery under the
terms of the contract); Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec.
18, 1981) (no genuine issue of material fact to support either breach of contract or breach
of warranty claim); Aplications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982) (user precluded from recovering for breach of
warranty by standard warranty disclaimers).
56. The principal reason for the demise of this cause of action was that by the end of
the decade most major computer vendors included disclaimers of all implied warranties
in their standard form purchase agreements, drafted in such a manner as to conform to
virtually every state's Uniform Commercial Code.
See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir., 1980); Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Samuel Black Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981); Bruffey Contracting Co. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981); Aplications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1982); Hi Neighbor Enter. v.
Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980); Masonite Employees Fed. Credit
Union v. Burroughs Corp., No. H76-146(C) (S.D. Miss. Apr. 3, 1979); Kalil Bottling Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (all holding the user's claim of breach of
implied warranties ineffective by virtue of the valid disclaimer of all implied warranties
included in the governing contract document).
Those courts addressing plaintiffs' challenges of unconscionability tended to follow the
arm's length reasoning of the middle 1970's, uniformly striking down such challenges.
See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Badger Bear-
ing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
57. Such limitations of remedies are permissible under the U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980); Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Investors Premium
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974); Westfield Chem. Co. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (all uphold-
ing such a limitation against users' claims of unconscionability).
59. 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980).
6(0. Id. at 1299-1300.
19831 Computer Litigation 339
Although vendors still continued to prevail in most tort actions
by users,61 the relative number of suits in which users were able
to recover for misrepresentation increased, especially where
fraudulent misrepresentation was pleaded. 62
As in the mid-1970's, those few plaintiffs attempting to assert
negligence as grounds for recovery continued to meet with little
success. One reason given by the court in Office Supply Co. v.
Basic/Four Corp.63 was the unwillingness of the court to extend
61. See, e.g., Iten Leasing Co., v. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982) (with
the exception of two pieces of computer hardware, the user failed to establish as false the
vendor's representations that the system would meet the user's requirements and objec-
tives); Management Assistance, Inc. v. Computer Dimensions, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 666
(N.D. Ga. 1982) (user's claim of fraud in the inducement not supported by the facts); Sun
'n Fun Stores, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 79-2450-MA (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 1982) (vendor
made no false, fraudulent, or misleading representations of fact upon which the user was
induced to rely to his detriment, and was therefore not liable under user's fraud claim);
Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part and remanded, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff failed to prove that vendor had
committed fraud in statements it had made to user); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980) (integration clause in the contract held effective
to exclude all extrinsic statements, including fraudulent ones); Burroughs Corp. v. Chesa-
peake Petroleum & Supply Co., Inc., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734 (1978) (no evidence of
fraud presented by the facts).
62. See, e.g., Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877
(6th Cir. 1982) (user awarded compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees on
the basis of vendor's material misrepresentations concerning the system's capabilities
and suitability); Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982) (vendor
committed fraud by knowingly selling a defective computer system); Triangle Under-
writers, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (fraud claim by user remanded
for further findings); Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., No. 80 Civ.
5710 (DBB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1982) (vendor's motion for summary judgment on fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims denied); Hi Neighbor Enter. v. Burroughs Corp.,
492 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (vendor's motion for summary judgment on fraud claim
denied); Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 1981)
(vendor's motion for summary judgment denied on the basis of vendor's representations
regarding its own capacity to perform, thus inducing the user to enter into a contract by
claiming the present ability to perform certain obligations, which may in some cases rise
to the level of fraudulent misrepresentation); Tyrrel v. Bedford Computer Corp., No. 81
Civ. 1530 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1981) (fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the
vendor may be a valid defense in an action for replevin of computer equipment against
the user); Aplications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (case
remanded for further findings on fraud issue); Lovebright Diamond Co. v. Nixdorf Com-
puter Corp., No. 78 Civ. 4585 (HFW) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1979) (vendor committed fraud by
representing to the user that it could convert existing software to meet the user's needs,
when, in fact, it could not); Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1348 (Ala.
1982), reh'g denied, Dec. 30, 1982 (vendor's misrepresentations held to have been uninten-
tional, thereby limiting the user's recovery in fraud to compensatory, but not punitive,
damages).
63. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
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a cause of action in tort to compensate for economic losses alone.64
Others simply found no basis for the claim in the facts of the
case. 65 Similarly, attempts by users to recover damages under
claims of strict liability,66 professional malpractice, 67 and unfair
business practices68 were also unsuccessful during this period.
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, dissatisfied users of
computer equipment and software have invoked a relatively
wide range of legal theories in their attempts to obtain relief
from unsatisfactory agreements with computer vendors. Cur-
rently, users pursuing claims rely on both the traditional con-
tract and warranty actions, and on the increasingly successful
tort actions. All of these causes of action present particular prob-
lems for the new or first time user.
Contract Actions
In most current cases, the first time user includes some form of
breach of contract or breach of warranty claim in an action
against a vendor. The greatest problems facing the inexperienced
user relying on a contract action are posed by statutes of limita-
tion, limitations on the remedies a buyer or lessee may seek, and
integration clauses. These problems are further compounded
where the user has signed the typically vendor-oriented standard
form contract containing a disclaimer of warranties and offering
little protection for the user's interests in the transaction.
64. Id. at 791.
65. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406,
384 A.2d 734 (1978) (vendor did not commit negligence in delivering user's computer sys-
tem late nor in failing to provide working software).
See also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (user
barred from pursuing negligence claim by statute of limitations). But see Accusystems,
Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., No. 80 Civ. 5710 (DBB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1982)
(case remanded for further findings on the applicability of a negligence cause of action to
the facts).
-.66. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); W.R.
Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (both cases dismiss-
ing without discussion the user's strict liability claim.
67. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). See also infra
notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
68. See Sun 'n Fun Stores, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 79-2450-MA (D. Mass. Feb. 23,
1982) (vendor did not engage in any conduct which could have been construed as unfair
]Vol. 14
19831 Computer Litigation
Statutes of Limitation
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 2-725(1), any
action for breach of contract must be commenced within four
years from the time the cause of action accrues.6 9 This limitation
has been extended to breach of warranty actions as well.7a In
many cases, however, the contract terms impose a shorter time
limit during which actions on the contract may be brought. This
is permitted under section § 2-725(1). 71 Major vendors, including
IBM and Burroughs, presumably relying on this provision, have
included two-year limitations in their standard form contracts.7 2
The problem most often arising in litigation involving these
provisions is determining when the cause of action actually
accrues. Vendors will typically argue that the statute tolls upon
execution of the contract, or, more commonly, upon installation
of the computer equipment or software.7 3 The user, on the other
hand, will argue that the statute begins to run when the vendor
stops trying to resolve the user's problem or refuses to make
further changes to the system.74 On occasion, the user has
or deceptive practices or acts); Samuel Black Co. v. Burroughs Corp., No. 78-3077-F (D.
Mass. Dec. 18, 1981) (case remanded for further findings of fact).
69. Note that while the sale of computer software and hardware has been held to be a
sale of goods and therefore subject to the U.C.C., see supra note 18, the sale of data
processing services, such as those provided by service bureaus, has not. Computer Ser-
vicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970).
While courts often apply U.C.C. principles in resolving disputes involving lease agree-
ments, a contract for the lease of computer equipment or software does not normally fall
within the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 2-102 & comment (1978). See also O.J. & C. Co. v. General
Hosp. Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 877 (1979) (user's lease of a Nixdorf computer did not
constitute a sale within the meaning of the U.C.C.).
70. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1979).
71. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978) states that "By the original agreement the parties may
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it."
See generally Note, The Effect of the Statute of Limitations on a Computer Vendor's
Liability in a Failed Computer Installation: Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 181 (1981).
72. IBM Corp., Agreement for Lease or Rental of IBM Machines (available from IBM
Corp., Armonk, N.Y. 10504); Burroughs Corp., Business Machines Group, Agreement for
Equipment Sale, #1914116 (June 1982).
73. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir.
1979); Atlas Indus., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 216 Kan. 213, 221, 531 P.2d 41, 47 (1975); W.R.
Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
74. See, e.g., Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 350 So. 2d 988,991 (La. Ct. App. 1977). See
also Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S. 2d
888 (1980) (breach occurred when vendor admitted that it couldn't solve the user's prob-
lem with its computer system).
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claimed that the statute begins to run when the user first discov-
ers the problem.7 5
A prime example of the problems that limitations of this type
may cause is illustrated by the plaintiffs difficulties in IBM
Corp. v. Catamore Enterprises.76 In this case, the vendor spent
an extended period of time, in excess of one year, attempting to
correct the problems Catamore appeared to be having with its
system. 7 When Catamore finally refused to continue making
lease payments on equipment, IBM sued.78 In its counterclaim
for damages, Catamore claimed breach of contract against the
vendor, along with several other causes of action.7 9 The court
found that the cause of action had accrued at the time of instal-
lation. Because more than a year had elapsed since the system
had been delivered and installed, and since the contract between
the parties limited causes of action to one year, the contract por-
tion of Catamore's claim was dismissed. 0
The Catamore holding appears to be the current state of the
law in several jurisdictions.8' In most cases, the contractually
imposed limitation on actions of two years following installation
allows the user sufficient time in which to discover any breach
and file suit against the vendor if the problem cannot be remedied.
In some cases, however, this formulation can work a harsh
result on the uneducated user. For example, a vendor often will
install computer software in phases, so that the user may begin
to make use of the hardware and whatever software is finished
without having to wait until all of the software is installed.8 2
Where the vendor delivers the final phase of the software a great
deal of time after the original hardware installation, the user,
having relied on the vendor's expertise, may not discover that
the computer cannot handle the additional programs'
requirements until the statute of limitations is about to, or
75. See, e.g., Closed Circuit Corp. of Am. v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 361, 365
(E.D. Pa. 1977).
76. 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976).
77. Id. at 1067.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1076.
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 74-75 and accom-
panying text.
82. This is not an uncommon technique for installing computer systems in the small
business environment. See Benn & Michaels, supra note 2, at 33.
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already has, run.8 3 The user may thus be left with little or no
time in which to determine the optimum cause of action and, if
necessary, to file suit. This limitation period may be further
reduced by the vendor's attempts to remedy the situation.84
One alternative to the Catamore approach would be to toll the
statute when the vendor completes every aspect of the system
installation, including software. A second would be to toll the
statute when the vendor ceases or refuses to make further efforts
to remedy the user's problems. A third alternative would be to
extend the tort concept of tolling the statute when the user
knows or should have known that an injury has occurred to con-
tract actions as well. 85 Each of these alternatives would give the
user a chance to use the completed system in a live environment
for a reasonable period of time,86 without having to file a prema-
ture lawsuit and without losing his right to sue for having exer-
cised patience. The vendor also would have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to correct the user's problems without fear of an impending
lawsuit.
Limitations of Remedies
A second problem often posed in computer contract litigation
for first time users concerns contractually imposed limitations on
the remedies available to the buyer in the event of a lawsuit
against the vendor.87 By contractually limiting the user's reme-
83. Where, for example, the computer lacks sufficient memory (the area of the compu-
ter used to store program instructions or data), storage capacity (the area of the computer
exclusive of memory used to store data), or processor speed (the rate at which the compu-
ter performs calculations and other functions), the defect may be in the original configu-
ration of the hardware, not in the additional programs.
84. Because a program is nothing more than a series of instructions, see supra note 1,
a programmer can sometimes make a program run more quickly or take up less space in
the computer's memory by rewriting or reorganizing the instructions (sometimes referred
to as the "code") in a more efficient manner.
85. This standard is similar to the one employed in Closed Circuit Corp. of Am. v.
Jerrold Elec. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 361, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See supra note 75 and accom-
panying text.
86. By including the delimiter "should have known," the reasonableness factor will
usually be taken into account.
87. Burroughs Corp.'s standard form contract, supra note 72, provides that:
Customer's sole and exclusive remedy in the event of defect is expressly limited
to the correction of the defect by adjustment, repair or replacement, at Bur-
roughs [sic] election and sole expense, except that there shall be no obligation to
replace or repair items which by their nature are expendable.
Under a section entitled "Limitation of Liability," the contract further states, in bold-face
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dies to the repair or replacement of defective equipment, or, in
some cases, to actual damages, the plaintiff is barred from seek-
ing reformation, rescission, or indirect, special, consequential, or
punitive damages. Limitations or modifications of remedies such
as these are permitted under U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a).88 For the most
part, these limitations have been allowed to stand. Users have,
however, challenged such limitations on two different grounds:
that the limitations defeat the essential purpose of the remedies
available to the buyer,8 9 and that such limitations are uncon-
scionable.
In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp.,90 Chatlos claimed the
provision limiting its remedies to repair or replacement was void
for failing in its essential purpose of providing reasonable relief
to the injured user.91 Chatlos asked the court to declare the pro-
vision inoperative. 92 The court found that after one and one-half
years of trying to correct the user's problem, NCR had still failed
to produce a system which functioned as warranted. The court
held that this time delay had "operated to deprive the purchaser
of the substantial value of the bargain" and that the correction
remedy was ineffective and therefore void.93
type, that "In no event shall Burroughs be liable for loss of profits, indirect, special, or
consequential damages arising out of any breach of the agreement or obligations under
the agreement."
IBM's standard form contract, supra note 72, contains essentially the same provisions
as Burroughs Corp.'s contract, except that IBM permits the customer to recover actual
damages, limited to the "greater of $100,000 or twelve Monthly Lease charges or Monthly
Rental Charges for the specific machines that caused the damages or that are the subject
matter of or are directly related to the cause of action."
88. U.C.C. § 2 -7 19(1)(a) (1978) states that:
(T)he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages
recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of
the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts.
89. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978) qualifies the vendor's right to limit remedies "Where cir-
cumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose."
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; see generally Note, U.C.C. § 2-719 As
Applied to Computer Contracts- Unconscionable Exclusions of Remedy?: Chatlos Sys-
tems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 14 CONN- L. REv. 71 (1981).
90. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 635 F.2d
1081 (3d Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1982).
91. 6:35 F.2d at 1085-86.
92. Md.
93. Id. Note that the court in Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619
P.2d 1055, 1059 (1980), reached a similar conclusion regarding an almost identical limita-
tion of remedies.
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In contrast, the court in Garden State Food Distributors, Inc.
v. Sperry Rand Corp.,94 upheld the limitation in a lease agree-
ment restricting the user's remedies to repair, replacement, or
recovery of prior lease payments against a similar challenge.9 5
The court based its decision on the fact that, unlike Chatlos, this
user had a remedy in the recovery of the lease payments, which
was the equivalent of a rescission. The court held that recovery
of the payments provided an adequate remedy in the event that
repair or replacement did not.96 In addition, the court stated that
such a limitation of remedies under the U.C.C. was not void for
having failed in its essential purpose where the defects in the
system were not latent, but were discoverable on reasonable
inspection.9 7 The court therefore upheld the provision.
Based on the limited amount of precedent in this area of
computer litigation, it is likely that a contract limiting the user's
remedies to repair or replacement would not withstand a user's
challenge that it failed in its essential purpose under § 2-719(2).
On the other hand, a contract permitting the repair or replace-
ment of defective equipment plus actual damages, similar to that
in Garden State, would probably be upheld.
A number of users have also attempted to circumvent contrac-
tually imposed limitations which exclude consequential, indirect,
or special damages by claiming that such limitations were uncon-
scionable and therefore void.98 Most courts have not been sym-
pathetic to this argument and have upheld such limitations as a
normal part of business dealings conducted at arm's length.99
These courts point out that the purchase of a computer is like
any other business transaction carried out by two presumably
knowledgeable business persons.100
The difficulty with this approach is that the inexperienced
user, although a business person, is not in a position to bargain
away knowledgeably any of his remedies. He is likely to know a
great deal less about computers in general, and computer con-
94. 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J. 1981) (litigated the same year by a lower court in the
same circuit).
95. Id. at 978.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 58-60, 87-89 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 789 (E.D. Wis.
1982).
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tracts in particular, than the vendor and must rely heavily on
the vendor's expertise throughout the transaction. By agreeing
to limit his remedies, he agrees to bear the risk of loss without
fully knowing what that risk might be.
One alternative approach in those cases where such limitations
either are found to have left the user without a viable remedy or
have been held unconscionable would be to award the user all
reasonably foreseeable damages. This remedy would prove es-
pecially appropriate where limiting the award to actual damages
would result in extreme hardship to the innocent first time buyer.
The potential magnitude of the consequential and other damages
a failed computer system may inflict on a small business is too
high a risk to force a small business to take. This risk is an
unreasonable one because the user may not realize the extent of
that risk due to his own lack of data processing experience.
Integration Clauses
The third problem area in computer contract litigation facing
the new or first time user involves the integration clauses now
included in virtually every major vendor's standard form con-
tract. 10' The problem most often arises in breach of contract or
warranty claims when the buyer seeks to admit oral statements,
or statements made in other, presumably non-contractual docu-
ments, such as correspondence, vendor publications, or prior
agreements or understandings. 102
As in other areas of the law, 10 3 courts have been understand-
ably reluctant to admit extrinsic evidence which adds to or modi-
fies the terms of an otherwise valid agreement. This reluc-
tance exists even though hardship may result to an inexper-
ienced user relying on an overzealous saleperson's promise of
performance and productivity. In Investors Premium Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp.,104 for example, the user signed a purchase
101. See supra note 23.
102. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Weston Int'l Corp., 577 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1978) (user
sought to introduce a letter written by vendor's representative in addition to the terms of
the contract); Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384
A.2d 734 (1978) (user attempted to introduce prior oral representations by vendor's agents
and statements contained in vendor's sales literature).
103. See supra note 23.
104. 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974).
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agreement containing the standard integration clause excluding
all "understandings, agreements, representations or warranties
.-. not specified herein .... "10 5 When the user tried to introduce
evidence of a Burroughs employee's statement that the system
"had sufficient capacity and capability to handle plaintiff's then
present business needs and to double that capacity without adding
additional personnel," the court held the statement inadmis-
sible.10 6 The court based its holding on the fact that the integra-
tion clause conformed to the U.C.C. requirements of form10 7 and
on its finding of law that the terms of a written contract cannot
be varied by parol evidence.108
Like those plaintiffs challenging contractually imposed limita-
tions of remedies, users who have claimed that these evidentiary
limitations are unconscionable have met with little success in
having them excluded or held inoperative. 10 9 This fact may
account for the recent increase in claims of misrepresentation
against computer vendors, especially by users having signed
standard form contracts. The availability of misrepresentation
as an alternative cause of action may help in mitigating the
effects of these integration clauses on users who have relied to
their detriment on extracontractual representations made by a
vendor's account representative.
Standard Form Contracts and Disclaimers of Warranties
An issue which is unique to claims of breach of warranty
involves the disclaimers of all warranties, express and implied,
currently included in most vendors' standard form contracts. 1 0
Such exclusions of warranties are permissible under the U.C.C. 11
and are not unconscionable under the current state of the law." 2
The net result is that few, if any, current computer hardware or
software contracts contain any operable implied warranties. In
addition, in most cases the only express warranties are those
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id. at 43-44.
107. Id. at 44-45.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45
(D.S.C. 1974); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp.. 538 F. Supp. 776, 786 (E.D. Wis.
1982).
110. See supra note 30,
111. Id.
112. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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specifically denoted as such in the terms of the contract. These
are usually limited to such tangential issues as assurances
against patent infringement and copyright law."13
While the effects of a warranty disclaimer may not, in and of
themselves, seem particularly unfair to the initiated user, the
combination of a warranty disclaimer and a limitation of liabil-
ity, when included in a standard form contract, can be particu-
larly damaging to a user seeking relief under a breach of con-
tract or warranty theory. It is not difficult to imagine a situation
where the user acquires a working, but useless, computer system.
Where, for example, the governing document is a user's standard
form contract and the only description of what the user is acquir-
ing is the hardware model and serial number, the user may be
left with a system that functions properly, but in no way fits the
user's time, storage or processing requirements. 1 4 Since the dis-
claimer of warranties excludes the operation of the implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness of purpose, the user can
neither claim that the system is not fit for the ordinary purpose
for which such system is used, nor claim that the system does
not perform the function for which it was acquired. If the con-
tract also includes an integration clause, the user is further pre-
cluded from admitting parol evidence in support of his claim of
breach. Even if the plaintiff is able to convince a judge or jury
that some sort of breach has occurred, a limitation of remedies
precluding everything but repair or replacement gives the user
nothing more than he already has: a working, but useless, com-
puter system.
It is in the face of these obstacles that claims of the uncon-
113. The only warranties contained in Burroughs' standard form contract, supra note
72, are that:
(i) no applicable statute, regulation or ordinance of the United States or of any
State has been violated in the manufacture and sale of the equipment;
(ii) Burroughs has title to the equipment and the right to sell it; and
(iii) equipment purchased under this agreement may be either newly manufactured,
or assembled by Burroughs from new and/or serviceable used parts (equi-
valent to new in performance) or equipment which has been previously
installed; and
(iv) the equipment delivered under this agreement shall be free of defects in' material
and workmanship under normal use and service maintenance for a period of
ninety (90) days from date of invoice on B20 and SR100 products; and one (1)
year from date of invoice on all other products, provided the equipment has
received the normal required maintenance service.
114. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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scionability of warranty disclaimers arise in computer contract
litigation. As previously noted, most of the courts have dismissed
these claims as not supported by the facts based on the parties'
positions as business persons dealing at arm's length.' 15
Tort Actions
Claims sounding in tort have become both more common and
more successful and are currently the major focus of many first
time users' claims for relief. There are a number of reasons why
a user might choose to include causes of action sounding in tort
in addition to, or instead of, claims based on contract law.
In some jurisdictions, for example, the statute of limitations
for causes of action in tort, or for certain specific torts, may be
longer than those in contract.116 This factor can be an important
consideration where the vendor has spent an extended period of
time installing the computer system or has attempted to correct
the user's problem before the user files suit.11 7
In addition, contractual limitations on damages or remedies,
such as are normally included in standard vendor contracts,
may not apply to claims sounding in tort, thus improving users'
chances for recovery.118 Evidentiary limitations imposed by
integration clauses similarly are inapplicable to tort actions,
since they are ineffective in excluding fraudulent statements.11 9
Therefore, while such clauses may defeat contract actions, they
do not affect claims of fraudulent misrepresentation.' 20 Finally,
115. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 743, 746 (2d
Cir. 1979) (New York's statute of limitations for fraudulent misrepresentation was six
years, but only four years for contracts for the sale of goods).
117. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 749 (D.N.J. 1979)
(court stated that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the concept of punitive
damages should not be permitted in litigation involving breach of a commercial contract,
whereas such damages would be available under causes of action in tort); Applied Data
Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 511 (D. Conn. 1975) (user permitted
to recover in tort those consequential damages excluded on the contract claim as
consequential).
119. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 747 (2d Cir.
1979) (statements of fraud made extraneous to the contract held admissible).
120. But see Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (1980)
(integration clause in the contract held to exclude all extrinsic statements, including
fraudulent ones); NCR Corp. v. Modem Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486
(1973) (under Pennsylvania law, the parol evidence rule bars all extracontractual state-
ments from admission into evidence, including fraudulent ones).
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disclaimers of warranties, while narrowing users' chances for
recovery in contract, do not affect plaintiffs' potential for recov-
ery in tort.' 21
On the other hand, causes of action in tort have not proven
nearly as successful in computer litigation as those sounding in
contract.1 22 Courts frequently are sensitive to the fact that a user
may be filing an inappropriate tort claim to avoid the inherent
problems of suing on the contract. One court, for example, held
that, while it was possible that a breach of contract might also
give rise to an action in tort, the claims must have independent
bases of liability.1 23 In dismissing the user's tort claim, the court
stated that the existence of certain tort elements, such as wan-
tonness, could not in and of itself convert the contract action into
a valid tort claim.' 24
Misrepresentation
As contract limitations continue to constrain users' remedies
under contract and warranty claims, users have begun to rely
more frequently on claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepre-
sentation. 125 In those cases where vendors have successfully
defended against such claims, the most common reasons given
for their successes were that the claims were not supported by
the facts,1 26 or that the misrepresentation claims were simply a
restatement of the contract claim and not supportable as separ-
ate claims in tort.127
In those few cases where users have prevailed on misrepresen-
tation claims, the courts' reasoning, where articulated,' 28 has
121. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115, 139 (D.
Minn. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971) (disclaimer of warran-
ties did not exclude statements of fraud).
122. The exception to this statement is, of course, breach of implied warranty claims,
which are no longer successful at all.
123. Closed Circuit Corp. of Am. v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
124. Id. at 364. See also Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39,
42 (D.S.C. 1974) (user's claim of fraud barred as having no separate basis in tort, being a
mere restatement of the plaintiffs contract claim); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs
Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1293, 1295 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (underlying
allegation of fraud claim identical with assertions contained in warranty claims and
therefore void).
125. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 51, 61.
127. Id.
128. One difficulty in predicting the future success of users claiming under this cause
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shown much promise for future plaintiff-users. In Dunn Apprai-
sal Co. v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,129 for example,
the court held the vendor liable for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions it had made concerning the capabilities, cost and suitabil-
ity of the accounting system it had leased to the user.'"" In
awarding not only compensatory damages, but punitive dam-
ages and attorney's fees as well,"' the court noted that the
vendor's computer equipment did not have the capabilities repre-
sented by the vendor without the user acquiring substantial
additional accessories. 132 The user, who had "little knowledge of
computers,"' 33 had thus been fraudulently induced to enter into
the contract on the basis of his reliance on the vendor's "mate-
rial misrepresentations."'' 34 The vendor was therefore held
liable. 3 5
In another recent case, Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp.,'': the
court found that the defendant's representatives had sold the
user an NCR computer system "with the knowledge that it was
not designed to perform the functions for which it was sold,"
thereby committing an actionable fraud.1" 7 In affirming the jury's
award of more than $2.2 million in compensatory and punitive
damages, the court also noted evidence of fraudulent practices
both in the sale and the installation of the computer system. 138
Because of the relatively small amount of definitive case law
in this area, it is difficult to generalize as to the potential success
of users choosing to sue on a theory of misrepresentation. Since
misrepresentation claims are successful in some cases, however,
it seems advisable for a user to include a claim of misrepresenta-
tion in the pleadings where warranted by the facts. This may be
the only chance of recovery the user has where the standard
integration clause and warranty disclaimers are included in the
contract and the source of disagreement is a statement or com-
of action has been the lack of definitive holdings in this area. See supra note 62.
129. 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982).
130. Id. at 880.
131. Id. at 81.
132. Id. at 880.
133. Id. at 879.
134. Id. at 880.
135. Id.
136. 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982).
137. Id. at 661.
138. Id. at 661-63.
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munication by a vendor's representative made outside of the
terms of the contract.
Negligence
Claims of negligence have proven ineffective in the few cases
where they have been asserted. The primary reason noted in
several cases was that the court or jury found no evidence to
support the claim.139 In one case, the court dismissed the claim
on the grounds that the laws of the forum state did not permit
recovery in tort for economic losses alone.140 In another case, the
court held that the claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 141
One variant of the negligence approach which has not proven
successful thus far, but which may have potential for success in
future litigation, is the claim of "computer malpractice" first
espoused in Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. NCR Corp.142 In Chatlos,
the dissatisfied user attempted to analogize the heightened
standard of care applied to medical and other professionals to
the computer vendor against whom it was seeking damages. The
court dismissed this claim in a footnote, explaining that "[s]imply
because an activity is technically complex and important to the
business community does not mean that greater potential liabil-
ity must attach. In the absence of sound precedential authority
the court... decline[d] the invitation to create a new tort."' 43
Although the court's decision that a malpractice action was
inappropriate was correct, the reasoning the court employed in
reaching this decision was faulty. While it is true that there is no
precedent for holding a computer vendor liable for having com-
mitted "computer malpractice," there is ample precedent for a
finding of malpractice against a professional who has failed to
exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties.144
139. Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 924 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1980); Bur-
roughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum, 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734, 735 (1978).
140. Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 791 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
141. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 746 (2d Cir. 1979).
142. 479 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 635
F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1982).
143. 479 F. Supp. at 741 n.1.
144. Malpractice standards have been applied to such professionals as attorneys,
architects, accountants, and even insurance company representatives. Holdridge v.
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An analogy may be drawn, for example, between architects,
who are subject to malpractice actions, and computer profes-
sionals, who currently are not. In performing their respective
jobs, both must possess a great deal of knowledge or skill not
normally possessed by the person or business commissioning the
work. Both are responsible for designing a system or framework
which will support a viable end product and adequately meet the
buyer's needs.1 45 Both may subject the buyer to substantial
financial loss from which the buyer may not recover should the
job be performed improperly. The buyers in both instances may
be either businesses or individuals.
The major difference between the two, which is the reason the
court's decision in Chatlos was correct, is that an architect is
subject to a uniform standard of certification where-
as the computer programmer is not. Until a uniform standard for
computer professionals is developed, it will remain difficult at
best to state accurately what the "reasonable computer profes-
sional" would do under a given circumstance.1 46
Another aspect of the "computer malpractice" cause of action
was relied on by the plaintiff in Triangle Underwriters, Inc. u.
Honeywell, Inc.147 In an attempt to avoid the applicable statutes
of limitation in its jurisdiction, the user sought to apply a theory
of continuous treatment 148 in determining when the cause of
action had accrued to Honeywell's repeated attempts to correct
the difficulties the user was having with its new computer sys-
tem.1 49 The court held that under New York law, the continuous
treatment theory applied only to medical professionals and,
further, that in this case there was no "professional relation-
ship" on which to base an extension of the doctrine.'5 0 The user
was thus barred by the applicable statutes of limitation in eight
Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
145. The architect's product is, of course, a building, while the computer professional
constructs a fully integrated computer system.
146. A standard of care is a prerequisite for any sort of malpractice standard. W.
PROSSEK LAw OF TORTS 150 (1971). See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
147. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
148. The continuous treatment theory, as it is normally applied to the medical profes-
sion, holds that in a suit for negligence against a physician or other medical professional,
the statute of limitations begins to run "at the end of continuous treatment... and not at
the last date of malpractice." 604 F.2d at 744 (quoting Borgia v. City of New York, 12
N.Y.2d 151, 157,237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1962)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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of the nine causes of action included in its complaint.1
The problems the user has in making a timely claim in tort
against the computer vendor are very similar to those he exper-
iences in contract. 152 The purpose of the continuous treatment
theory as it is applied to the medical profession is to avoid hav-
ing the patient interrupt the course of treatment in order to file a
claim against the medical professional. 153 Applying this doctrine
to the computer professional would permit the user to continue
negotiating with the vendor to obtain a resolution of the problem
without having to file suit. Only when all attempts have failed
should the user be required to seek help from the judicial system.
By holding that the cause of action accrues at the end of the
treatment rather than the beginning, 154 the courts would dis-
courage the filing of premature lawsuits and generally provide a
more realistic approach to litigating tort claims against comput-
er vendors. This approach would work particularly well when
integrated with a computer professional malpractice standard.
FUTURE TRENDS IN COMPUTER LITIGATION
In the past, vendors have enjoyed a great degree of success in
litigation involving their standard form computer contracts. It is
therefore unlikely that these standard form contracts will undergo
significant changes within the near future.155 Given these facts,
the best approach for the computer user seeking recovery in the
future will be to avoid contract litigation in all but the most blat-
ant cases and to proceed under one of the more recently tried tort
theories of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresen-
tation, or negligence.
The most popular tort action under which first time users are
now beginning to proceed is fraudulent misrepresentation. 56
Given the recent successes of several users claiming under this
151. Id. at 737.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 69-86.
153. 604 F.2d at 745.
154. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
155. Many of the problems experienced by the new, first time user may begin to dis-
appear within the next ten to fifteen years as the number of personal computers in homes
and schools work to alleviate much of the computer illiteracy plaguing both large and
small businesses today. See generally Machine of the Year, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 15;
"Computer Kids'; Master "Basic Skill," N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1982, § 3 (Business Day), at
1, col. 3.
156. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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theory,1 57 filing an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation
may well be the best approach for many users proceeding against
vendors within the near future. The difficulty in employing this
approach, however, is that the user must establish that the
vendor intentionally misrepresented his product's capabilities to
the user.1 58 Hence, claims of fraudulent misrepresentation may
require a level of proof too stringent for the user to meet, particu-
larly where the user has not carefully documented the events
leading up to the suit as they happened.
An alternative approach in these cases would be to proceed
under theories of negligent misrepresentation 159 and negligence.1 60
Although there is little precedent in computer litigation for suits
under these causes of action, both approaches hold much poten-
tial for increased success by users in future litigation. In many
cases where the first time computer user is unhappy with the
system he has acquired, the problem is not that the vendor has
intentionally deceived him about what the system is or can
do. 61 Instead the user's expectations are not met because the
vendor's sales representative failed to make him understand
what he was getting, or failed to fully comprehend the user's
needs before proposing the hardware and software configura-
tion. The vendor did not intentionally injure the plaintiff, but did
so by careless actions or statements. An action under a negli-
gence or negligent misrepresentation theory is clearly the most
appropriate cause of action under these circumstances, particu-
larly where any action on the contract or the warranties has
been foreclosed.
The negligence approach, however, presents the difficult issue
of what duty of care the computer professional owes an inexper-
ienced user. As previously noted, because of the lack of success of
the traditional "reasonable man standard," users have at-
tempted to establish a heightened "computer malpractice" stan-
dard of care by which the conduct of computer professionals
157. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 29.
159. See supra note 52.
160. See supra note 53.
161. But see Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 384 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1982) (user
awarded more than $2.2 million for vendor's fraudulent misrepresentations concerning
its computer equipment and systems, including such acts as replacing the user's disc
drive with an older model and switching the serial numbers in order to disguise the
replacement drive).
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could be measured.' 62
While a cause of action in computer malpractice may hold
some long-range potential for obtaining relief for the injured user
and for simplifying computer litigation, the probability that this
heightened duty of care will be adopted within the immediate
future is small.163 Even if a uniform standard were developed,
there would likely remain a widespread lack of uniformity of
standards within the industry, because the current demand for
data processing professionals in the United States is so high
that the marketplace could not afford to begin hiring only certi-
fied data processors.' 64 In addition to this lack of standards,
there are several subissues which must be resolved before such a
level of care could be imposed on the computer industry. These
subissues include the potential need for differing standards for
computer vendors, software houses, consulting firms and service
bureaus, the scope of the computer professional's liability, the
extent to which the user's degree of experience, knowledge or
reliance will affect the computer professional's duty of care, and
the means by which such standards could be kept current with
an industry as large, complex and subject to change as is the
computer industry.
By relying on actions under fraudulent and negligent misre-
presentation, 65 on the other hand, the user may make use of
causes of action which are available now and which have begun
to show some signs of promise for plaintiff-users. Furthermore,
because these causes of action require a showing that the plain-
tiff relied on the defendant's faulty representation, 166 they en-
courage a more realistic treatment of the reliance element implicit
in the relationship between inexperienced users and sophisti-
cated vendors. In order to fairly assess the injured user's claims,
courts must employ standards which recognize the character of
162. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
163. But see Note, supra note 71, at 200.
164. See Patterson, Who Will Keep the Computers Running?, INDUS. WEEK, Nov. 2,
1981, at 46-51.
-165. The user may also achieve some degree of success under the traditional "reason-
able man" standard negligence action or by pleading a combination of negligence and
malpractice standards. See, e.g., Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc.,
No. 80 Civ. 5710 (DBB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1982) (case remanded for a determination as to
whether negligence and/or malpractice causes of action were available under the facts of
the case).
166. See supra notes 52, 53.
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this relationship.16 7
CONCLUSION
Courts have generally failed to take into account the relative
positions of the parties in transactions between computer vend-
ors and inexperienced users. Because courts have frequently
ignored the significance of this relationship in their treatment of
aggrieved users' claims, the causes of action traditionally avail-
able to dissatisfied users have thus far provided little relief. More
realistic approaches to established causes of action which take
into account the user-vendor relationship and new causes of
action recognizing the positions of the parties must be con-
sidered by both attorneys and judges involved in computer lit-
igation if first time users are to be afforded the opportunity for
appropriate relief within the judicial system.
SUSAN J. MACAULAY
167. For other possible solutions to the problems besetting the dissatisfied computer
user, see Benn & Michaels, supra note 2, at 38-40, 43-44; Note, Unconscionability and the
Fundamental Breach Doctrine in Computer Contracts, 57 NOME DAME LAw. 547 (1982).
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